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  Non-executive Directors and Auditors in the Context of 
the UK Corporate Governance: Two (or Too Many?) 
“Pirandellian” Characters still in the Search of an Author?
PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE*
1. Foreword
The Companies Act 2006,1 while providing a rigorous framework for Corporate 
Governance, abstains from extending a likewise courtesy to the classification of 
non-executive directors, despite a significant use by listed companies of said cat-
egory. Similarly, UK company legislation continues to place a telling emphasis on 
the audit of company accounts, whilst the legal-management audit, albeit quite 
familiar to foreign legislations,2 remains extraneous to domestic legislation and 
corporate practice. 
Such apparent aberrations are analysed in this work as a possible weakness of   
corporate governance in the UK and, to a certain extent, one of the potential explana-
tions for the market failure which has plagued businesses (particularly within the 
ﬁnancial sector) over the previous two years in Britain.3 
Against this backdrop of suspect legal frailties lies the very essence of this article 
– a studied undertaking, grounded in legal methodology, as to whether sufﬁcient scope 
* Heriot-Watt University.
1 Henceforth also the “CA 2006”.
2 In this respect, the yardstick for the purposes of a comparative analysis will be the Italian juris-
diction.
3 It is worth mentioning that as of today the British banking system is formally private but sub-
stantially (and hugely) public. The intervention in the banks, in certain cases up to 100% of their share 
capital, materialised through different but clear “episodes” in between August 2007 until March 2009. 
Corporate names such as “Northern Rock”, “Halifax Bank of Scotland” and, on the top of all, “Royal 
Bank of Scotland” are the sad epitome of the “Waterloo” (from the French perspective!) of such a 
collapse.
For details see de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-executive e 
Auditors sull’Asse Roma-Londra’ (2009) Le Società (12) 1556,1557, particularly footnote 2. See also 
M De Poli, ‘Crisi Finziaria e Salvataggio delle Banche Inglesi. Il Banking Act 2009’ (2009) Rivista 
Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia (1 – Annex) 5,59. The latter Author refers in the title to the 
“  English” banks (banche inglesi), whereas the entire “British” banking sector has been the subject of the 
perusal. 
At journalistic level, see New York Times, Private Ownership of Banks is Called Crucial to Brit-
ain, in http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/private-ownership-of-banks-is-crucial-uks-darling-
says/, retrieved on 5th September 2009; Banking Times, Lloyds Banking Group passes to majority stake 
ownership, in http://www.bankingtimes.co.uk/08032009-lloyds-banking-group-passes-to-majority-state-
ownership/, retrieved on 5th September 2009; This-is-money, Lloyds can’t avoid State ownership, in 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=490175&in_page_id=2, retrieved on 5th 
September 2009.
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exists within the UK legal system to facilitate the adoption of an altogether more 
convincing and clear-cur system of corporate governance hinged upon the creation 
of a committee responsible for the supervision of management and functionally inde-
pendent from the board of directors. This committee, which should, to all intents and 
purposes, neutralize the somewhat controversial ﬁgure of the non-executive directors 
– currently existing at formal level in listed companies and acknowledged by the vast 
majority of the British scholars as also pertaining to non-listed companies4, is ideally 
conceived in this work as a body to be rendered mandatory for all typologies of com-
panies.5 Moreover, the collegiate body in question should assume full responsibility 
for handling the audit of management within the company, leaving the auditing of 
accounts still within the remit of external auditors.6 
In this respect, it is furthermore the purpose of this work to demonstrate that the 
possible “birth” of a committee charged with management supervision, in tandem 
with the appropriate “euthanasia” of non-executive directors, might encourage the 
development of an altogether more prudent and sound business ethic, facilitated by 
the company-wide presence of an autonomous corporate “organ”, instigated at a leg-
islative level and duly bestowed with speciﬁc powers of initiative aimed at protecting 
the shareholders. Such a micro-structure, it is conclusively argued, when carefully 
reconciled within the conﬁnes of the relevant British corporate entities, would not 
affect the harmonious and perpetual momentum of entrepreneurial activities, nor 
would it substantially burden the same with excessive incremental costs. 
In order to corroborate this proposal, a comparative legal analysis will be under-
taken incorporating alternative systems of corporate governance, such as that evident 
in Italy – a system traditionally founded upon a more articulated set of norms, and in 
particular upon those aimed at regulating the (mandatory) existence of an independent 
body (the board of statutory auditors) which, for listed and non-listed companies alike, 
is compelled to audit both the management and the accountancy of the company.  
2. The “Ontological” Explanation of Corporate Audit
As a concept, the corporate audit may divulge two ramifications: a first one relat-
ing to the accounts; a second one legal-administrative in nature. The accounting 
audit is entrusted with the technical verification that the accounts of the audited 
company are in order. Habitually, due largely to the technicalities entailed in the 
relevant tasks, this audit is performed de iure by experts qualified as accountants.7
The bail-out of Northern Rock and its moral hazard unleashed on the British Banking system are 
analysed in P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘From “Uncle Scrooge” to “Fred the Shred”; the Legend of the 
Sound and Prudent Scottish Banker’ forthcoming.  
4 See infra further explanations.
5 In reality, and based on the explanations provided further on in this work, it is more realistic to 
limit the utilisation of this body to quoted companies. See infra Part 10.
6 See Sect. 495 of the Companies Act 2006.
7 According to the common deﬁnition, “[t]he purpose of the statutory audit is to provide an inde-
pendent opinion to the shareholders on the truth and fairness of the ﬁnancial statements, whether they   NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 761
In contrast, the “legal” (or regulatory) audit may be deﬁned as a check, carried out 
by an external body (or alternatively by a group of directors, so long as they are inde-
pendent), overseeing a general observance, on the part of the management body, of 
the law and by-laws as well as of the principles of proper management.8
As far as UK legislation is concerned, the second typology of audit is roundly 
ignored when it comes to non-listed companies; conversely, listed companies are 
subjected to a form of regulatory audit where, under the entrusted jurisdiction of the 
audit committee, the secondary legislation requires the compliance of each and every 
issuer.9 
In some foreign legislations such as the Italian, the corporate playing ﬁeld tends 
to be considerably more geared towards promoting the culture of the audit;10 it is 
hardly a  coincidence that characteristic of all these jurisdictions is the stipulation that 
all companies should appoint a board of statutory auditors (ancillary to the external 
auditor), whose speciﬁc purpose is to perform a managerial-legal audit, in addition 
to the accounting one which remains assigned to an external auditing ﬁrm.11 
3. The State-of-the-art of the Audit in the UK: “Glimpses” of Legislation 
   (Companies Act 2006) 
The transparency of the law regarding accounting auditing is garnered  from a brief 
reading of the legislation currently in force in the UK decreeing it mandatory for 
all companies (either private or public, listed or non-listed, with specific limited 
exceptions12), under the supervision of a professional external firm. In this respect, 
and without labouring the subject, the most telling provision of law is that contained 
under Sect. 495, CA 2006, stating that:
have been properly prepared in accordance with the Companies Act and to report by exception to the 
shareholders on the other requirements of company law such as where, in the auditors’ opinion, proper 
accounting records have not been kept.” (see ICAEW, July 2006, cited in T Copnell, ‘External Audit, 
Internal Audit and the Audit Committee’ in R Smerdon (ed), A Practical Guide to Corporate Gover-
nance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 277.)
8 The deﬁnition is that inferable from the description of the duties of the board of statutory auditors, 
provided with by Art. 2403, of the Italian Civil Code (henceforth the “CC”); see amplius Part 6 infra, 
particularly 6.2. Similarly, the “legal audit” is taken for granted within the Italian law literature: see ex 
plurimis LA Ferrari, ‘Il Controllo Sindacale alla luce della Riforma’ in G Paolone (ed), Le Nuove Regole 
di Governance alla luce della Società a Base Azionaria (Giappichelli, Torino 2004) passim, particularly 
at 54; L Benatti, ‘Commentary to Artt. 2397–2406’ in A Maffei Alberti (ed), Il Nuovo Diritto delle 
Società (CEDAM, Padova 2005) II, at 892.
9 Reference is made in this respect to FSA Rule DTR 7.1.1 R. For a more ample analysis see the 
following Part 3 infra.
10 Parts 6 and 7 infra.
11 See amplius under Part 3 infra.
12 According to Sect. 475, these exceptions are those relating to “small” companies (Sect. 477), 
for dormant companies (Sect. 480) and for non-proﬁt-making companies subject to public sector audit 
(Sect. 482). As to relevant comments, see amplius L Sealy & S Worthington, Cases and Materials in 
Company Law (8th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) at 73.PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE 762
“A company’s auditor must make a report to the company’s members on all an-
nual accounts of the company of which copies are, during his tenure of ofﬁce – 
(a)  In the case of a private company, to be sent out to members under sec-
tion 423;
(b)  In the case of a public company, to be laid before the company in gen-
eral meeting under section 437.”
This audit relating to the accounts carries echoes of the set of provisions set forth 
by the correspondent over-layer13 where Article 1 defines the prerogatives of the 
Directive in ruling the regulatory audit of annual and consolidated accounts. 
Embedded within the accounting audit, to which every company is fundamentally 
answerable to in Britain, is a system of duties (mainly a duty of care) which each 
auditor owes to the company concerned (but not to its members) – a culmination 
of blossoming jurisprudence over the past century.14  With the enactment of the CA 
2006, auditors’ liabilities remain untouched, although certain rules, such as that 
enshrined in Sect. 534 which considers certain valid agreements aimed at limiting 
the liability of the auditors, may constitute a step backwards,15 rather than a positive 
development to the matter at hand.16  
In contrast, the regulatory audit is not contemplated at all with regard to non-listed 
company activity in the UK, nor do scholars traditionally indulge in its legal analysis 
at domestic level.17 Actually, as for “quoted” companies, an audit committee is indeed 
prescribed by some soft legislation.18 In an explanatory way, the FSA Rule DTR 7.1.1, 
bearing resemblance to Art. 41(1) of the Directive, states that:
13 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statu-
tory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC, henceforth also the “Directive”. 
14 See among others Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) but also Equitable 
Life Assurance Society v. Ernst and Young [2003] EWCA Civ 1114. See amplius PL Davies, Gower 
and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 
Ch. 22, but also N Grier, Company Law (3rd edn W Green/Thomson Reuters, London 2009) at 275,277.   
15 See the Companies Act 1985. G D Morris, ‘Auditors’ in B Hannigan and Others (eds), Butter-
worths. Corporate Law Service. Corporate Administration: Corporate Finance (Issue 2004 Lexis Nexis, 
London 2004) at 13/1, 13/83.
16 Likewise, critical views seems to be expressed by those authors (inter alios, L Sealy & S 
Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 
73) who clearly track such norms to the lobbying activity of the auditors’ association.  
17 In commenting on the audit, UK Company Law manuals usually impinge on a mere analysis 
of the accounts, whereas the regulatory audit seems to be extraneous to the interests of the domestic 
researchers. See, eloquently, PL Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, cit. at 
759,828; S Mayson, D French & C Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (26th edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009) at 520,541; L Sealy & S Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company 
Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) at 73,82.
18 First comments as regards the Audit Committee at its dawn may be found in M Bruce, Rights 
and Duties of Directors (Butterworths, London 1998) at 180,182, as well as in PL Davies, Gower and 
Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, cit. at 784,787.  NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 763
“An issuer must have a body which is responsible for performing the functions 
set out in DTR 7.1.3 R. At least one member of that body must be independent 
and at least one member must have competence in accounting and/or auditing.”
In addition to this, pertaining to the functional scope of the auditors, the following 
DTR 7.1.3 R. prescribes that:
“An issuer must ensure that, as a minimum, the relevant body must: 
(1) monitor the ﬁnancial reporting process; 
(2) monitor the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal control, internal audit where 
applicable, and risk management systems; 
(3) monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts; 
(4) review and monitor the independence of the statutory, and in particular the 
provision of additional services to the issuer.”19 
Of no less importance, as the audit committee is de facto encapsulated within the 
same management body (the BoD), the FSA rules require that the company verifies 
whether the requisite of independence has been duly satisfied; more specifically, 
according to the FSA Rule DTR 7.1.2:  
“The requirements for independence and competence in accounting and/or audit-
ing may be satisﬁed by the same member or by different members of the relevant 
body.”
Despite the variegated picture of provisions hitherto alluded to under this Part, 
it must be critically noted that the functions vested in the audit committee do not 
appear to focus on an autonomous activity; rather they constitute, for the most part, 
a duplication of the tasks already entrusted to the external auditor, essentially with 
a total exclusion of any regulatory audit. Significantly, the members of the audit 
committee – themselves already ‘honorary members’ of the “directorship” – are 
not bound by any liabilities different from those entailed of normal directors, 
whereas in other jurisdictions20 the statutory auditors, in addition to forming a 
separate body, are, on the one hand, clearly bound by specific duties (culpa in 
19 Also in this case, the wording is similar to the Directive, particularly Article 41(2) stating that:
  “Without prejudice to the responsibility of the members of the administrative, management or super-
visory bodies, or of other members who are appointed by the general meeting of shareholders of the 
audited entity, the audit committee shall, inter alia:
(a)  Monitor the ﬁnancial reporting process;
(b)  Monitor the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, internal audit where applicable, 
and risk management systems;
(c)  Monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts;
(d)  Review and monitor the independence of the statutory auditor or audit ﬁrm, and in particular 
the provisions of additional services to the audited entity.”
20 See infra under Parts 6, 7 and 8 the scenery depicted in the matter of the Italian legislation.PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE 764
vigilando) while, on the other, can play an active role in terms of protecting the 
minority shareholders,21 well beyond the (fundamentally weak) duty of periodical 
report currently entrusted with the audit committee in Britain. 
Finally, while (soft) UK legislation does require the appointment of internal audi-
tors, the role of these professionals (usually employees of the company) merely con-
sists of a rather arbitrary analysis of the reputational, operational and strategic risk.22 
Such an activity does not differ from that performed by similar professionals in other 
countries and, on a more pertinent note, the liabilities they can therewith incur are 
merely of a labour law nature, given the fact that they do not reside at the “pinnacle” 
of the corporate hierarchy.23 In light of this, they will lie outwith the parameters of 
analysis set out in this work.
To simplify, in the UK:
a.  The company legislation does not cater for any independent body in charge 
of a regulatory audit of non-listed limited companies, given the fact that the 
audit for such companies impinges exclusively upon that concerning the 
accounts; 
b.  Exclusively, in respect of listed companies, the “soft legislation” requires 
the appointment of an audit committee within the same board of directors; 
however, the relevant tasks, because constituting a duplication of the roles 
already entrusted with the external auditors, appear to be mainly, if not 
exclusively, of a non-regulatory nature.24 
4. Non-Executive Directors
4.1. The “Mission Impossible” of a Legal Categorization?
Set apart from the external auditors, duly characterised at a legislative level, the 
demarcation line between executive and non-executive directors runs true to an 
empirical, rather than a theoretical strand,25 and seems to arise from the practical 
21 See also in this respect infra Part 8 as their power of initiative vis-à-vis the judicial authority.
22 R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 
2007) at 284.According to the Institute of Internal Auditors (Code of Ethics and International Standards 
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, March 2004, www.iia.org.uk), “internal auditing 
is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve 
organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and gov-
ernance processes”. 
23 See P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-executive e Auditors 
sull’Asse Roma-Rondra’ cit. at 1560.
24 P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-executive e Auditors 
sull’Asse Roma-Londra’ cit. at 1560.
25 It is properly reminded (S Mayson, D French & C Ryan, cit. at 424) that:
“The distinction between executive and non-executive directors has no signiﬁcance in company 
law though it may cause difﬁcult problems in employment law”.   NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 765
observation that in companies, particularly the listed ones, certain directors tend 
quite naturally to play a more active role than others.26 The first “officers” will be, 
almost by definition, “executive” and will oversee the management of the company, 
while the ‘second tier’ will be defined “non-executive”.27 
Also, among commentators, there is a certain proclivity to somehow differentiate 
between the two categories, particularly on the basis that executive directors display 
a stronger connection with the company, simply entwined in a contract of employ-
ment. It is not the case that, among these scholars, the conclusion (or the tautology?) 
usually drawn is one where, as a result of a contract of employment subsisting 
between the company and the director, the latter shall qualify automatically to “exec-
utive” status.28 
In reality and re melius perpensa, under the same area of common law, this con-
ceptual automatism is far from being corroborated, given the fact that, through a slow, 
albeit signiﬁcant, “Darwinian” evolution, court decisions such as Re City Equitable  
Fire Insurance Co29 and Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd30 (the “guns” 
are usually loaded” by those intent on strenuously defending the alternative category 
of the non-executives) might be more than compensated by more recent decisa such 
as Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v. Stebbing31 (where, by contrast, non-executive direc-
26 It is emphasized (see S Mayson, D French & C Ryan, ibidem) that:
“An executive director of a company typically devotes his or her whole working time to the 
company (or a number of companies in a group), often as an employee of the company, and has 
a signiﬁcant personal interest in the company as a source of income.”
See also A Dignam & J Lowry, Company Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) at 270. The 
Author spells out the axiom that: 
“Non executive directors are normally appointed to the boards of larger companies to act as 
monitors of the executive management”.
27 See D French, S Mayson & C Ryan, cit. at 424.
28 Inter alios, J Birds & Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (Jordans, Bristol 2009) at 601. There 
is probably a Freudian slip in the authors’ statement when they declare:
“In any event, directors employed under a contract of service, that is in effect an executive 
director, will be bound to execute objectively reasonable care, skill and diligence by virtue of 
his position as employee.” [emphasis added] 
In reality, critical – and well demonstrated – views on the category of the non-executive directors may 
be read in R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2007) at 123,127. 
29 [1925] Ch. 407. Particularly and beyond the same narrative, which may nonetheless be read in C 
Wild, S Weinstein & J Bisacre, Smith & Keenan’s Company Law (14th edn Pearson Longman – Scot-
tish Edition, Edinburgh 2009) at 338, the paradigm of the care “drawn” by that court decision, in the 
words of Romer J, is worthy of mention:
“(a) A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may 
reasonably be expected from someone of his knowledge;
(b) A director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company;
(c) where duties may properly be left to some other ofﬁcial, a director is justiﬁed, in the absence of 
grounds for suspicion, in trusting that ofﬁcial to perform his duties honestly.” 
30 [1957] AC 555.
31 [1989] BCLC 498. The narrative of both this court decision and those cited in the following two 
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tors were deemed liable for culpa in vigilando because they signed blank cheques, 
following a simple request from the full-time director, for loans made to third parties 
which violated a piece of legislation then applicable, namely  the Moneylenders Acts), 
and substantiated in Re D’Jan of London Ltd32 and Norman v. Theodore Goddard33. 
It should be duly noted that, in “Dorchester”, the perennial doubt that the liability 
was afﬁrmed, given the peculiarity that the non-executive directors were ultra-qual-
iﬁed chartered accountants and speciﬁcally hired for their expertise, will never be 
completely dispelled.34 However, it is nonetheless undeniable that the ultimate judicial 
assumptions tend to clearly track a joint liability to all the directors, irrespective of 
whether they enjoy executive status or not, in cases of maladministration. 
An indirect conﬁrmation of any deﬁnitive stance advocated by the British Courts 
in the matter of non-executive director liability is offered by two comparatively recent 
cases: Re Barings plc (No 6) (1999);35 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley 
and others.36 
The former dealt with the degree of supervision which a director was expected to 
exert on a delegated business (more speciﬁcally, the deputy chairman of a banking 
group which had been delegated to the business unit in Singapore and ended up report-
ing huge losses due to the mismanagement of an employee). The principle propounded 
was that the director in question did indeed have a duty to acquire and maintain suf-
ﬁcient knowledge of the company’s business in so much as to enable him to discharge 
his responsibilities.37 
As for Equitable, the company sued each director for damages in a violation of 
duties incurring losses amounting to upwards of £3 billion. However, in 2003 Lang-
ley J38 rejected a non-executive director’s interim application, whose aim was to 
dismiss the company’s claim, on the assumption that their (i.e. the non-executive 
directors’) decisions were somewhat mitigated by an entitlement to rely on the exec-
utive directors. Quite eloquently, the judge explained that the claim for negligence 
against the non-executive director had a real possibility of success,39 given the fact 
that: 
32 [1994] 1 BLCL 561.
33 [1992] BCLC 1028. 
34 See L E Talbot, Critical Company Law (Routledge-Cavendish, Oxon 2008) at 184 and C Wild, 
S Weinstein & J Bisacre, cit. at 339.
35 (2000) 1 B.C.L.C. 523.
36 [2003] EWHC 2263. Furthermore, an Australian case (AWA Ltd v. Daniels (1995) 37 N.S.W.L.R. 
438) might be deemed as following the same line of reasoning of “Equitable”. 
37 A Dignam & J Lowry, cit. at 323. Re Barings Plc (No. 6) is echoed by Re Barings Plc (No. 5) 
[2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 523., particularly in the judgment of Moritt LJ In this respect, see also R Smerdon, 
A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 125. 
38 Page 41.
39 Remarkably, a dismissal of a similar interim claim in a parallel proceeding was pronounced 
against the auditor, Ernst & Young (Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Ernst & Young [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1114. See L Sealy & S Worthington, cit. at 73,82. Cases and Materials in Company Law (8th edn 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008). The Authors correctly place emphasis on the fact that:
“Companies do not appoint NEDs [non-executive directors] without good reason; they are usu-
ally chosen for their speciﬁc expertise, experience or business connections. NEDs who provide   NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 767
“[A] company may reasonably, at the least, look to non-executive directors for 
independence of judgement and supervision of the executive management”. 
Interestingly, such a hypothesis – paving the way for a successful claim – did not 
come to fruition as the relevant parties (in particular the company and the non-
executive directors concerned) managed to reach a mutual understanding. Conse-
quently, Equitable Life dropped their claim against all nine directors and the former 
auditors and, furthermore, paid all the costs.40  
The aforementioned court decisions, however, clearly leave room for speculation 
that there are very limited circumstances whereby non-executive directors may claim 
immunity from liability, despite the tenor of the Code. 
Doctrinally, an unmistakable death knell has called time on the days when a non-
executive director could be deemed simply a “watchdog”; if not now an angry “blood-
hound”, he must certainly act as an astute “terrier”.41 
Even more persuasively, the UK corporate legislation (particularly in its recent 
developments, idem est the CA 2006), on the one hand, completely misjudges the 
concept of non-executive directors, while, on the other, spelling out quite unequivo-
cally the axiom of the joint and several liability of the directors. In this respect, the 
“twofold objective/subjective test”,42 recently revamped and “launched” under statute, 
on the one hand requires all directors to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence,43 
whilst simultaneously abstaining from tracing any “war trench system” between arti-
these services can expect to be paid reasonably well for their contributions, but of course this 
means that they may become ﬁnancially dependent on the company to a greater or less extent. 
Is it realistic to expect NEDs to be “independent”, and to supervise executive management? 
Equally, is it realistic to expect companies to appoint and pay fees to individuals who have little 
to offer apart from independence and policing role?”. 
40 R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance (3rd edn Thomson/Sweet&Maxwell, 
London 2007) at 123,124; L Roach, ‘Equitable Life and Non-Executive Directors: Clariﬁcation from the 
High Court’ (2005) Company Lawyer 253,254; Id., ‘An Equitable Solution for Non-Executive Direc-
tors?’ (2006) International Company and Commercial Law Review 117 ff. 
See also, from a non-doctrinal perspective and in terms of news comments, J Rossiter, ‘Equitable 
Life Abandons Negligence Claim’ (Evening Standard, 2nd December 2005); R Fletcher, ‘Former Equi-
table Life Directors Sell Properties to their Wives’ (Timesonline, 17th April 2005); Equitable Life (Press 
Release), ‘Litigation against Former Directors and Ernst & Young’ on http://www.equitable.co.uk/con-
tent/content_11.htm, retrieved on 6th September 2009.
41 R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance, cit. at 126. 
42 In line with the desiderata of the Law Commission (see Law Commission No 261, para 5.20, 
p 52). 
43 For clarity sake, it is worth citing the proper wording of section 174 of the CA 2006:
 “The care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with-
(a)  The general knowledge, skill and experience that may be reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relations to the company, and
(b)  The general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.”
From an international point of observation and in Italian, critical comments relating to this new duty of 
the members of the board of directors have been expressed more recently in P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘I 
Doveri dei “Members” del “Board of Directors” e le RelativeResponsabilità in Regno Unito alla luce 
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ﬁcial categories (“executive” versus “non-executive”). Such evidence may therefore 
yield unerring proclamations that Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co might be a 
relic of a past era! 
Last but not least (although the relevant topics are dissected funditus henceforth),44 
the comparative analysis conducted in this work could lead one to conclude that it 
would be logically incorrect to postulate any category of non-executive directors, also 
for the sake of protecting the minorities’ shareholders. 
4.2. The Raison d’Être (if any) of Non-Executive Directors in the Soft 
    Legislation
As to listed companies, an attempt to conceptually mould non-executive directors 
may be found in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance.45–46 The Code47 
prescribes, first of all, that in listed companies (A.3. Main Principle) 
44 See Parts 6 and 7 infra.
45 Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (June 2008), 
in http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined_Code_June_2008/Combined%20
Code%20Web%20Optimized%20June%202008(2).pdf.
46 A history of the development in the UK of both the Codes and the numerous Reports (Cadbury, 
Greenbury, Hampel) in the corporate governance is encompassed by R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to 
Corporate Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 1,7. A concise “history” of the 
Reports may be read in J Dine & M Koutsias, Palgrave Macmillan Law Masters Company Law (7th 
edn Palgrave Macmillan, London 2009) at 151,153. The latest “episode” of this tragicomic “tv series” 
might be represented by the Walker Report, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other 
Financial Industry Entities (16 July 2009) in http://www.audit-committee-institute.be/dbfetch/52616e6
46f6d4956f9ed6cb8ae5277dbec35c233bab54a5b/walker_review_consultation_160709.pdf. The Walker 
Report appears to place emphasis on the “board size, composition and qualiﬁcation” of the “NED”. 
However, the proposed approach still fails addressing the root of the problem, that is to say, the liability 
of the NED within the general concept of their duties set forth under statute. The Walker Report, with 
limited reference to banks and ﬁnancial institutions, afﬁrms that a differentiation under statute between 
liabilities of NEDs and Executive directors would not be required; namely, “new statutory provision 
through amendments of CA 2006 would be unlikely to contribute positively to such improvements and 
could impede them through promoting compliance with speciﬁc rules rather than strengthening an 
overall culture of good governance.” (Walker Report, cit. 38). 
However, the same “Walker Report”, in contradiction with these conclusions, afﬁrms that “[..] the 
core separation between the role of the executive and non-executive board member is well-entrenched 
if not always well-understood. [..]” (“Walker Report” cit. 33). In reality, it could be argued that, if a 
separation of the roles between the two ﬁgures does exist, then either the liability should be clearly 
deﬁned under statute or the “Italian job” (i.e. convergence of the non-executive directors towards an 
autonomous body; see Part 6 below) should be better pursued. The statement, therefore, seems to be 
contradictory.  
47 The Listing Rule 9.8.6(5) prescribes that companies registered in the UK with a primary listing in 
the UK must disclose in their annual report the extent to which they have complied with the Combined 
Code in the previous 12 months and to give the reason for any non-compliance. The Listing Rules might 
be endowed with a sort of enforcement by virtue section 73A of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (FSMA 2000); however, they do not represent “law” stricto sensu.
Incidentally, the UK mercantile environment seems to be traditionally reliant on the principle of trust 
and, as a result, on the belief that few rules, not legally binding because merely conventional, may be 
nonetheless efﬁcacious through the mere moral suasion. This system is opposite to the continental one,   NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 769
“The board [of directors] should include a balance of executive and non-execu-
tive directors (and in particular independent non executive directors) such that 
no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision 
taking.” 
The above provision is echoed in Provision A.3.2 whereby, for listed companies 
above the FTSE 350, at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should com-
prise of non-executive directors determined by said board to be independent 
whereas, for smaller listed companies, the suggested minimal threshold of non-
executive directors should be two.48 
In addition to this, the Code speciﬁes that the board itself, rather than an external 
body or authority, shall assess the independence of a director.49 In detail, Section 
A.3.1. speciﬁes that:
“The board should determine whether a director is independent in character and 
judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely 
to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement. The board should 
state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding 
the existence of relationships or circumstances [...]”. 
In performing such a self-assessment, the board should acknowledge either the 
relationships or the circumstances existing between the directors and each company 
concerned (see again Code Provision A.3.1)50. However it is noteworthy, from a 
where rules, usually abundant, are hinged upon legal sources (rather than the mere conventional ones); 
as a result, every violation of each binding provision rules sparks off a coercive sanction against the 
wrongdoer, well beyond the tenuous moral suasion. See P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, 
Amministratori Non-executive e Auditors sull’Asse Roma-Londra’ cit. passim.  
48 See again R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance  (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2007) at 137. The Combined Code commented on this textbook is that of 2006.
49 Namely: 
“The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers to be 
independent.”
This self-assessment is correctly viewed as a weakness by R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Cor-
porate Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 136.
50 More speciﬁcally, if the director:
– “has been an employee of the company or group within the last ﬁve years”;
– “has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company 
either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such 
a relationship with the company”;
– “has received or received additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s 
fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a 
member of the company’s pension scheme”;
– “has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees”;
– “holds cross-directorships or has signiﬁcant links with other directors through involvement in 
the other companies or bodies”;
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legal perspective, that such relationships and circumstances represent mere rebut-
table presumptions (in other words, presumptions iuris tantum rather than iuris and 
de iure), as the board, despite such necessary acknowledgements and given the 
tenor of the Code, could nonetheless deem as duly met the requisite of indepen-
dence for the director concerned, particularly if “it determines that [he] is inde-
pendent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may 
appear relevant to its determination.”51  In such a scenario, the concept of “inde-
pendence” takes on quite a ‘loose’ connotation, as its evaluation is fundamentally 
left to the discretion of the board.
Equally important is the Code’s attempt to deﬁne the duties of non-executive direc-
tors. In so doing, not only does the Code dramatically fail to ingratiate itself to the 
interpreter, but it also inexplicably ingenerates hermeneutical confusion within its 
own main statements.52 As an insightful prelude then to a more comprehensive anal-
ysis under section 4.3 below), the framework in question, deviating markedly from 
the aforementioned recent legal interpretations, speciﬁes that, for non-executive direc-
tors, the time devoted to the company’s affairs “is likely to be signiﬁcantly less [...] 
than for an executive director”. In addition to this, “the detailed knowledge and 
experience of a company’s affairs that could reasonably be expected for a non exec-
utive director will generally be less than for an executive director.” (sic!)53 
Following a non-dissimilar reasoning, para 1 concludes that “[t]hese matters may 
be relevant in assessing the knowledge, skill and experience which may reasonably 
be expected of a non-executive director and therefore the care, skill and diligence that 
a non-executive director may be expected to exercise.
4.3. ”Non-Executive Directors: A Critical Perspective
Propelled by a combined reading of both the ultimate aforementioned provisions in 
company legislation and the latest rulings in the same matter, the following critical 
views can be feasibly expressed:
a.  As it is “artiﬁcially” stated (by the Code) and/or assumed (by the Scholars) that 
non-executive directors dedicate less time to the management of the company 
than their executive colleagues, the former appear to generously beneﬁt from a 
“mitigation” of liability; in other words and per absurd, their liability for poten-
tial maladministration, if held accountable by a shareholder, might be viewed 
– “has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of the ﬁrst election”.
See, for the further circumstances affecting the principle of independence, R Smerdon, A Practical 
Guide to Corporate Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 137.
51 A.3.1 of the Combined Code.  
52 In this respect see eloquently Schedule B of the Combined Code.
53 As to the aspect at stake, the tenor of the Combined Code even contrasts previous legal stances, 
such as the Derek Higgs report published in January 2003 (http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/corp-governance/
higgs-tyson/page23342.html). In this report, which should have inspired the same Combined Code, the 
role of the non-executive directors is intended to cover four areas: strategy; performance; risk; people. 
In this respect, see amplius A Dignam & J Lowry, cit. at 395.  NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 771
with leniency at a judicial level, given their possible protestations, paradoxically 
supported by the tenor of the Combined Code, that they were “allowed to ded-
icate less time to the management of the company”.54 The absurdity of the pro-
vision is that, for listed companies, where investors seek and indeed expect 
transparent investment protection, the door has been left ajar for certain direc-
tors (i.e. of non-executive status), to evade liability and seek refuge in the glim-
mering light of “immunity” held steadfastly at the end of a long tunnel of litiga-
tion by the Combined Code (but not by the legislation).55
b.  In addition to the potential “mitigation” of liability, the speciﬁc duties which 
non-executive directors are required to discharge, according to the Code, are 
somewhat ambiguous. It may have found greater consistency in methodically 
spelling out the speciﬁc tasks by which said directors are bound during their 
‘limited devotion’ to company activities. By contrast, the Code, on the assump-
tion that56 “[...] the detailed knowledge and experience of a company’s affairs 
that could reasonably be expected of a non-executive director will generally be 
less than for an executive director”, paves the way for this limited involvement 
to theoretically lead one (a judge!?) to adopt a more benign evaluation of the 
care, skill and diligence expected of non-executive directors.57 Even more wor-
ryingly, an assertion that “the knowledge and experience [..] expected of a non-
executive director will generally be less than for an executive director” drives 
a coach and horses through the diametrical philosophy underpinning Sect. 174 
of the CA 2006, where full care and dedication is expected of all the directors.58 
c.  From a methodological perspective, such perspectives arising out of a reading 
of the Code are highly arguable, as they are not the result of legislative provi-
sions of law – rather they constitute a mere “non-rigid set of rules”.59
d.  As to the requisite of independence stipulated by the Code,60 the requirement 
that a non-executive director should be singled out as independent (and deemed 
as such) among his colleagues,61 albeit conceptually creditable (a non-executive 
54 Again Schedule B of the Code.
55 Such a view is not shared by those that – probably tautologically – tend to express unfettered 
enthusiastic endorsement of the philosophy of the Code. E.g. J Birds & Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company 
Law (Jordans, Bristol 2009) at 602, at footnotes 86, namely the statement: 
“It is thought that the provisions of the combined Code on Corporate Governance [..] may also 
be a useful guide, at least as concerns the non-executive directors of listed companies.”
56 Schedule B (Guidance on liability of non-executive directors: care, skill and diligence), p 24.
57 An attempt to corroborate such a theory is connected to the case Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety. In this controversy, one of the non-executive directors, Mr Martin, sued by the company for negli-
gence, wrote to the ﬁnancial Times (15th March, 2004) arguing that, in discharging his duties, he was 
not expected to be a “bloodhound”, rather a “watchdog” that, after receiving an answer from the other 
directors, could not go further in his investigations. See also R Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate 
Governance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 124.
58 Supra dissected.
59 See the Combined Code, July 2008, Preamble, page 1.
60 See Parts 4.1 and 4.2 supra.
61 See again the above referred Provision A.3.1, particularly the passage where it is prescribed that 
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director can certainly also be independent – and usually he is!), fails to address 
the distinct possibility that an executive director could also fulﬁl an “indepen-
dent” role.62 
5. Are Non-executive Directors an Illusionary Category?
A critical summary of the matter must acknowledge the category of the non-exec-
utive director, as moulded by the Code, to contain some fallacious elements for the 
reason that, instead of enhancing investor protection, it might paradoxically deprive 
them of significant legal prerogatives, particularly in the context of watertight liti-
gation brought forward in cases of alleged mismanagement.63 It is not so unrealis-
tic to imagine64 that the non-executive directors concerned (ergo, those sued for the 
alleged violation of their duty of care and diligence) may attempt to get away with 
it (ergo, to reject or reduce their degree of liability) exclusively on the basis that 
they were not “fully dedicated”. 
In addition to this, the category of the non-executive director appears inconsistent 
with the same contemporaneous legislative apparatus, where a clear distinction 
between “executive” and “non-executive” is lacking and all directors are therefore 
expected and required to assume responsibility, jointly and severally, for any viola-
tion of their duties.65 As previously emphasised, the category in question could now 
be a “relic” of a bygone era, “buried” by the legislator thanks to the new criterion of 
the duty of care, skill and diligence mapped out by Sect. 174(1) and 174(2). 
Furthermore, and independently of the state-of-the-art legislation (which is in itself 
self-explanatory), the same jurisprudence has more recently rejected such a 
characterization,66 although admittedly a certain degree of acquiescence continues 
particular independent non executive directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals 
can dominate the board’s decision taking.” [emphasis not per original text].
In other words and through an interpretation of the Combined Code, there should be an ideal 50% 
of executive and non-executive directors and, among the latter, each listed company should take pain 
to select those being “independent”.  
62 Again, to be an executive and to be independent represent two different ontological categories. 
A director is executive or not according to whether he employs full time in the company. The same is 
independent or not according to whether he is autonomous or, conversely, expression of the majority 
shareholders. 
63 See above amplius Part 4, particularly 4.3.
64 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley and others and particularly the “legal trench” erected 
by the non-executive directors sued for mismanagement. See above Part 4, particularly 4.1.
65 Hermeneutically, the tenor of Sect. 170 (“The general duties in sections 171 to 177 are owed by 
a director of a company to the company”) is clear and imposes the observance of each duty to each 
director, whether or not conventionally qualiﬁed as executive.
66 Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v. Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498 and, even more,  Re D’Jan of London 
Ltd [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 561, cited supra as to non-listed companies. As far as listed companies are con-
cerned, see Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley and others, cit.  NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 773
nonetheless (albeit through tautologies, rather than through an apodictic reasoning) 
to be fuelled by certain scholars.67  
Finally, beyond these legal explanations, and by way of mere logical reasoning, 
in the context of a theoretical legal system a category of non-executive directors must 
be shaped in such a way as to deﬁne, constructively, the parameters of their respon-
sibilities and areas of liability,68 (if) different from those covering the executive direc-
tors.69 Alternatively, it may be desirable not to intervene at all in the relevant discipline. 
Unfortunately, by all accounts it seems that the choice adopted by soft legislation in 
the UK favours the latter! 
6. Directors and Auditors in the Italian Legal System; A Comparative 
   Analysis
The moral suasion, dear to the British legal system, has lacked the necessary allure 
to seduce the jurists in continental Europe. A paradigm befitting of this different 
approach exists within the Italian jurisdiction, particularly the rules governing its 
Civil Code and aimed at regulating the matter of auditing activities.
6.1. Italian Systems of Corporate Governance
As a necessary prelude to this analysis, it is worth mentioning that the Italian cor-
porate governance, as a result of the reform passed by Legislative Decree n. 17th 
January 2003, no. 6 (the so called Company Law Reform),70 proves to be quite 
flexible, as it permits each company, according to its own organizational and eco-
nomic strategies, to opt for one of three different typologies of corporate gover-
nance, specified in its own by-laws. This system came about as the result of a 
deregulation process of the regime of the joint stock companies (società per azioni), 
propounded by the Italian parliament in 2001 and culminating in the empowerment 
bestowed on the government to adopt detailed norms in the matter in accordance 
with the principles specified in the framework.71 
67 See supra Part 4.1, particularly footnote 28.
68 See Part 6 (particularly 6.3) infra, as to the liability of the statutory auditors in Italy.
69 For instance, by specifying among their duties the audit.
70 Amended by Legislative Decree 6th February 2004, no. 37 (Correttivo riforma delle società, 
“Amending Provisions of the Reform of the Companies”), and further on amended by Legislative Decree 
28th December 2004, no. 310 (Nuovo correttivo riforma delle società, “New Amending Provisions to 
the Reform of the Companies”). 
71 Ex multis, See G Ferrarini, ‘A View from Italy’ in K J Hopt & others (eds), Corporate Gover-
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6.1.a. The “Classical” Italian System of Corporate Governance
If a mode of corporate governance is unspecified in the by-laws, the system adopted 
shall automatically adhere to the standard one, based on a board of directors (Con-
siglio di Amministrazione) and a board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale).72 
6.1.b. The Two-Tier System
On the other hand, a given company may decide against the “classical” system and 
select one where the by-laws permit management and supervision to be carried out 
by a management board and a supervisory board respectively.73 The latter will end 
up being a body of composite nature, endowed both with the powers typically 
bestowed on the shareholders’ meeting and those conferred on the board of statu-
tory auditors. In terms of legal terminology, this system is referred to as “two-tier”.74 
6.1.c. One-Tier System
The third alternative system of governance is commonly defined as “one-tier”. 
Derived essentially from British inspiration,75 it allows the company to arrange for 
a board of directors and a subsequent committee within (the Comitato per il con-
trollo sulla gestione, the committee for management supervision). In this case, 
given the tenor of art. 2409-sexiesdecies, CC, although“[t]he management of the 
business is under the exclusive responsibility of the board of directors”, the super-
vision of the company shall be entrusted to the committee made up of directors (at 
least one third of the members of the board of directors), therefore fulfilling the 
independence requirements set out for statutory auditors.76
6.1.d. Duties and Liabilities of the Directors in Italy
It is outwith the scope of this work to delve too deeply into the principles which 
underpin the duties of the directors in Italy beyond noting that said directors are 
unequivocally jointly and severally liable, as enunciated by statute:77
“The directors shall fulﬁll the duties imposed upon them by law and by the by-
laws with the diligence required by the nature of the ofﬁce and their speciﬁc 
capabilities. They are jointly and severally liable to the company for damages 
72 N Abriani & Others, Diritto delle Società. Manuale Breve (3rd edn Giuffrè Editore, Milano 
2006) at 213. 
73 This system is of clear Germanic inspiration. See G Ferrarini, cit. at 49. 
74 N Abriani & Others, Diritto delle Società. Manuale Breve, cit. at 213
75 As regards this aspect, Italian scholars usually stress the alleged “Anglo-Saxon” origins of this 
system. See among others, V Allegri & Others, Diritto Commerciale (5th edn Monduzzi Editore, Bolo-
gna 2005) at 195,263, particularly 198. On this point see better the stances of P de Gioia-Carabellese, 
‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-executive e Auditors sull’Asse Roma-Londra’  cit. at 1567, 
particularly footnote 84.
76 Speciﬁed better under Art. 2409-septiesdecies, CC. See again, inter alia,  N Abriani & Others, 
Diritto delle Società. Manuale Breve, loc. ult. cit. at 213.
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deriving from the non-observance of such duties, except for functions vested 
solely in the executive committee or materially vested in one or more directors.”   
The ambit of liability extends to omissions, particularly in cases where a member 
of the board, being aware of prejudicial facts, did not do all within his power to 
prevent said facts from occurring or to eliminate or reduce their harmful conse-
quences.78 
Exemption from liability, either for acts or omission, is dependant solely on the 
director, so long as he is without fault, ensuring his grievances are promptly recorded 
in the minutes and resolutions kept by the board of directors and, just as swiftly, given 
in written notice to the chairman of the board of statutory auditors.79 In any case, it 
becomes obvious even from a rudimentary reading of these provisions (particularly, 
the line “the diligence required by the nature of the ofﬁce and their speciﬁc capa-
bilities”) that the Italian legislation has adopted, for a long time,80 a clear-cut approach 
to the area of “care, skill and diligence”, to semantically put it in the terminology of 
Sect. 174 of the CA 2006. The diligence is not that expected of the pater familias (in 
other words the layman)81, rather of an “agent” speciﬁcally appointed for the tasks 
that he is required to discharge,82 irrespective of the “general knowledge, skill and 
experience that the director has”. Therefore, revealingly, the Italian paradigm of cor-
porate liabilities, in terms of care, bears a striking resemblance to the objective-
subjective one, more recently adopted in the UK.83 At the risk of over-elaborating, a 
subtle exegesis would lead one to conclude in even more accurate terms that the direc-
tors’ care in Italy is a “prevailingly objective one”. This reasoning is hinged on the 
fact that the administrator is traditionally bound by a duty of particular care (that of 
the agent). However, speciﬁc subjective qualities inherent in the directors could be 
exceptionally taken into account – particularly at a judicial level – as constituting 
mitigating circumstances for his liability.84
78 Art. 2392(2), CC. See ex plurimis GF Campobasso, Manuale di Diritto Commerciale (4th edn 
UTET, Torino 2007) at 262.  The Author takes pain to note that, because this would be a liability due to 
the non-delegated director omitting to prevent or impede the harmful conduct of the delegated directors, 
the liability of the former would result in being a liability for culpa in vigilando, with the consequence 
that, if compelled to reimburse the damages, he would be vested with a recourse action against the latter. 
79 Art. 2392(3), CC.
80 Namely since the enactment of the CC, (AD) 1942.
81 The “father of the family”.
82 G Visentini, ‘La Diligenza come Criterio di Responsabilità dell’Amministratore’ in V Afferni & 
G Visintini (eds), Principi Civilistici nella Riforma del Diritto Societario (Giuffrè, Milano 2005) at 
99, 107. 
83 The “objective-subjective test” under the Companies Act 2006 is synthesized by PL Davies, 
Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, cit. at 488, 495.
84 See inter alios N Abriani & Others, Diritto delle Società. Manuale Breve (Giufrré, Milano 2006) 
at 226:
“Il livello di diligenza dovuto sarà tanto più elevato al crescere della dimensione e della comples-
sità dell’impresa gestita, tenendosi conto delle capacità individuali. A semplice titolo di esempio, 
l’erronea valutazione delle conseguenze di un contratto potrà produrre conseguenze diverse per 
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Moreover, the Italian system does not engage in any attempt to deﬁne the non-
executive director, nor does the associated literature indulge so much in its ontologi-
cal categorization. Rather, what carries weight under Italian statute is a possible (but 
not imperative) deﬁnition of delegated directors as opposed to the non-delegated 
ones.85–86  Distinctive of such a typology of directors is their organizational role within 
the company, particularly their role in ensuring that the organizational, administrative 
and accounting structure is suitably conducive to the nature and size of the undertak-
ing and, at intervals set by by-laws or, in any case, at least every six months, they 
report to the board of directors and the board of statutory auditors on the general 
nel campo produttivo, rispetto a quelle che produrrà per un avvocato, nominato nel consiglio 
per le sue speciﬁche competenze in materia contrattuale. Si tratta di un parametro di diligenza 
come detto stringente, che mira alla crescita della professionalità di chi gestisce la società e a 
far sparire il malcostume delle cariche ricoperte con distrazione e disinteresse.”
 (The level of required diligence shall be even higher according to the dimension and complex-
ity of the managed company, by taking into account the individual capacities. Merely for explana-
tory purposes, the erroneous assessment of the consequences of a contract shall produce different 
consequences in respect of a director graduated in chemistry and appointed in connection of his 
speciﬁc competences in the ﬁeld of the production, in comparison to the consequences that it 
[the erroneous assessment] shall produce against a lawyer, appointed to the Board [of Directors] 
because of his speciﬁc competences in the matter of the contracts. The paradigm of diligence 
is a very strict one and is aimed to improve the professionalism of those in charge of the com-
pany and to make disappear the malpractice of posts discharged with disinterest and distraction)   
85 See also P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-Executive e Audi-
tors sull’Asse Roma-Londra’ cit. at 1568. Art. 2381(2), CC, clearly provides that: 
“If the by-laws or the shareholders’ meeting allow so, the board of directors may delegate its 
functions to an executive committee consisting of some of its members, or to one or more of its 
members.” 
Doctrinally, see V Salaﬁa, ‘Amministratori senza Deleghe fra Vecchio e Nuovo Diritto Societario’ 
(2006) Le Società (3) 290, 294. The Author correctly emphasises that:
“Il trattamento della responsabilità degli amministratori senza deleghe nei confronti della soci-
età e dei terzi è meno generico di quello proprio del vecchio art. 2392 c.c., nel quale se ne 
prevedeva il solidale coincolgimento nella responsabilità, che veniva collegata alla omissione 
della dovuta vigilanza sull’andamento della gestione oppure all’omesso impedimento di atti pre-
giudizievoli, dei quali fossero a conoscenza, oppure ancora all’omesso intervento per attenuarne 
o eliminarne le conseguanze dannose.”
 (The way the liabilities of the non-executive directors against the company and third parties 
are dealt with [as a result of the Reform] is less generic than that provided under the previous 
art. 2392, CC, where it was set forth a principle of joint involvement with the liabilities, that used 
to be connected to the negligence in the due supervision on the general management, or to the 
omitted impediment of prejudicial conducts, of which they were aware, or ﬁnally to the omitted 
intervention aimed at attenuating or eliminating the relevant damages).  
Contra:  G Visentini, ‘La Diligenza come Criterio di Responsabilità dell’Amministratore’ in V 
Afferni & G Visintini (eds), Principi Civilistici nella Riforma del Diritto Societario (Giuffrè, Milano 
2005) at 99,107. The A. places emphasis on the fact that, although the new text arising out of the 
company reform does not mention any more the word “agent“, in actual term the innovation is merely 
semantic. The controversial paradigm of the “diligence of the agent” has been replaced with a more 
neutral criterion; however, according to the A. this does not add anything more to what, in the matter, 
already held by the jurisprudence and propounded by the prevailing scholars. (G Visentini, ibid., at 107)   
86 Cfr G Ferri, Manuale di Diritto Commerciale (12th edn UTET, Torino 2006) at 352, 353. 
In this respect, the A. correctly emphasises than, within the “two-tier system”, the management board 
may nonetheless delegate powers to one or more members singularly; however, the delegation cannot 
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course of business and the foreseeable chain of events, as well as recording the most 
signiﬁcant transactions, by size and nature, carried out by the company and its sub-
sidiaries.87 Despite this, the provisions of law are uncompromising in stipulating that 
certain core functions cannot be delegated in any way and must remain consigned to 
the entire board.88 Even more remarkably, any delegation which does occur is required 
to be transparent89 and shall not, in any circumstances, be a justiﬁcation for the non-
delegated director to escape liability, as he is required to act only after having ﬁltered 
all due information.90 For this reason, non-delegated directors in Italy maintain a 
“concurrent competence” which they end up sharing with the delegated ones, for the 
reason that the delegation does not confer new powers, rather it bestows the delegated 
powers also on the delegated directors.91
87 Art. 2381(5), CC. For comments, see particularly F Bonelli, Gli Amministratori di S.p.a. (Giuf-
frè, Milano 2004) at 53,54. In the past and before the company reform occurred in 2003, the duties 
to which non-delegated directors were subject, were even more accentuated in Italy, because all the 
directors were responsible for the veriﬁcation of the general course of the business (namely, il generale 
andamento della gestione). See Art. 2392(2) in the wording existing before such a reform. Therefore, 
it was common to afﬁrm that this liability was an “objective-vicarious” one (F Bonelli, ibid. At 53).
This Author places emphasis on the fact that:
“La diversiﬁcazione [..] degli organi delegati rispetto a quelli dei consiglieri senza deleghe, 
determinerà una maggiore estensione della responsabilità dei primi rispetto a quella dei 
secondi, in conformità al loro diverso ruolo, ai loro diversi poteri e alla loro diversa retribuzi-
one. Insomma, la riforma del 2003 ha preso atto del dato di fatto, noto a tutti della sostanziale 
diversità tra consigliere dleegato e consiglieri deleganti. [..].” 
88 Art. 2381(4). Exempli gratia: the drafting of the balance sheet, entitlement conferred on the board 
by the by-laws to increase the sharecapital and to issue bonds convertible in shares, the drafting of the 
project of merger or demerger, duties entrusted with the board in case of mandatory decrease of the 
share-capital because of losses. See GF Campobasso, ibid. At 258.
89 F Galgano, ‘Le Nuove Società di Capitali e Cooperative’ in Galgano (ed), Trattato di Diritto 
Commerciale e Diritto Pubblico dell’Economia, vol XIX, I (CEDAM, Padova 2004) at 268; even more, 
O Cagnasso, ‘Brevi Note in tema di Delega del Potere Gestorio nelle Società di Capitali’ (2003) Le 
Società 802, according to whom the delegation would be invalid if devoid of any subject.  
Such an interpretation appears to be corroborated by the sheer tenor of Art. 2381(3), CC, providing 
that “[t]he board of directors sets the contents, restrictions and terms for the exercise of the power 
delegated [..].” 
90 Art. 2381(6), CC. In addition to this, each director may request the delegated persons and bod-
ies to provide information relating to the management of the company at a board’s meeting. In this 
respect, among authors it is correctly spelled out that the silence of the non-delegated directors as to 
the information received by the delegated ones shall be tantamount to an approval, with all the neces-
sary consequences in terms of assessment of liabilities (see V Salaﬁa, ‘Proﬁli di Responsabilità degli 
Amministratori di Società di Capitali’ (2005) Le Società (11) 1333,1339, particularly at 1335. 
91 S Ambrosini, ‘L’amministrazione e i Controlli nella Società per Azioni’ in S Ambosini (ed), La 
Riforma delle Società. Proﬁli della Nuova Disciplina (Giappichelli, Torino 2003) at 63; P Morandi, 
‘Commentary to Art. 2381’ in A Maffei Alberti (ed), Il Nuovo Diritto delle Società. Vol I (CEDAM, 
Padova 2005) at 664, 684.
Judidicially, albeit with reference to controversies arisen out before the company reform, see Corte 
d’Appello Milano 21/01/1994, (1994) Le Società 923; Tribunale Milano 17/03/1986, (1986) Le Soci-
età 619.  
See also F Di Sabato, Diritto delle Società (2nd edn Giuffè, Milano 2005) passim, particularly at 
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Exclusive to listed companies, “independent directors” are alluded to, albeit at a 
mere non-legislative level. To elaborate, a speciﬁc framework, promoted more than 
a decade ago under the aegis of the Italian stock-market – the so called Codice di 
autodisciplina delle società quotate, which listed companies are invited (but not 
compelled) to adopt92 – suggests that an adequate number of directors be independent 
and, furthermore, that such a requisite be veriﬁed from time to time by the same board. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that the categorization of the “independent director” 
does not impact upon his degree of liability, as, on the one hand, the relevant source 
is a non-legislative one while, on the other, the independent director is nonetheless a 
“full” director (executive, albeit subsisting contiguous to a peculiar relationship with 
the company, that is to say, the independence).   
6.2. The Mandatory Role of the Board of Statutory Auditors
Regardless of any previous indication to the contrary, whatever the system of cor-
porate governance adopted by an Italian company,93 the auditing activity and the 
specific body in charge of it seem to represent solid foundations on which the 
structure of each corporate entity is built from a legal perspective. 
Firstly, in every Italian public company limited by shares (either listed or non-
listed) as well as in any private limited liability company,94 a statutory board of audi-
“Il dovere di vigilanza, in particolare, è un mero dovere di attenzione alle più rilevanti vicende 
della società, che fa carico agli amministratori, esista oppure no un “organo” delegato. Esso si 
speciﬁca in un diritto-dovere di “informazione” e in un diritto-dovere di istruzione” sui singoli 
atti ogni volta che, in base alla diligenza del mandatario, vi è motivo di ritenere che l’interesse 
sociale possa venire compromesso [..].” 
92 More recently, Art. 124-bis, CFA, more clearly provides that each Italian listed company with 
shared quoted in securities markets either in Italy or in another country of the European Union will 
annually communicated to the market information relating to whether they adhere to codes of conducts 
promoted by the market company or by other associations. In Italy the system is commonly summarised 
with the maxim “either comply or explain”.
The “Codice di autodisciplina delle società quotate”, also referred to the “Codice Preda”, in its ﬁrst 
version, has been commented by P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Codice di Autodisciplina elaborato dal Comi-
tato per la Corporate Governance delle Società Quotate’ (2000) Le Società (10) 107,119, as well as by 
M De Mari, ‘Il Codice di Autodisciplina delle Società Quotate in Materia di Corporate Governance’ 
(2000) Rivista di Diritto Privato 141 ff. As to the second version comments may be read in M De 
Mari, ‘Corporate Governance e Nuovo Codice di Autodisciplina delle Società Quotate’ (2003) Rivista 
di Diritto Privato 541 ff, as well as in G Presti, ‘Tutela del Risparmio e Codice di Autodisciplina delle 
Società Quotate’ (2006) Analisi Giuridica dell’Economia (1) 47 ff.
The latest version of the Codice (2006) is critically referred to by M Stella Richter jr, ’ Il Nuovo 
Codice di Autodisciplina delle Società Quotate e le Novità Legislative in materia di Autoregolamen-
tazione’ (2007) Rivista del Diritto Commerciale 149, 163. 
93 Doctrinally, it is adumbrated (G Ferrarini, cit. at 49) that:
“The possibility to choose between three different systems is intended to be a substitute for 
regular competition, as the choice, for example, of the unitary board might work functionally as 
a (partial) equivalent to the choice of UK law.”
94 This is a typology of company which, mutatis mutandis, could be conceptually associated to the 
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tors (or alternatively, a committee, in the case of a one-tier system) shall always be 
required.95  
In this context, it is worth highlighting the clear-cut deﬁnition of the duties con-
ferred upon the members of the board of statutory auditors,96 provided by the Italian 
legislation under Art. 2403, CC:
“The Board of statutory auditors controls the observance of the law and the by-
laws, the observance of principles of proper management and, in particular, the 
adequacy of the company’s organisational, administrative and accounting struc-
ture and the actual operation of the company.”
Secondly, the CC takes pain to deliberate in detail over both the competence and 
independence that each auditor is obliged to comply with.
As to the former, Art. 2397, para 2, speciﬁes that:
“At least one acting member and one substitute shall be selected among those 
listed in the Register of Auditors kept at the Ministry of Justice. The other mem-
bers, if they are not listed in the said Register, shall be selected from persons 
registered with the professional rolls speciﬁed by decree of the Minister of Jus-
tice, or among full university professors of economic or legal courses.”
In other words, because the core duties which the body in question is required to 
discharge are of a profoundly technical nature, the relevant tenure shall be reserved 
to persons with specific competence, rather than to quisque de populo. In this 
respect, all auditors shall be selected de minimis from amongst those persons reg-
istered with certain professional roles specified by decree of the Ministry of Justice; 
incidentally, the roles referred to, are those grouping specific professional catego-
ries, such as qualified lawyers and qualified accountants, in addition to university 
lecturers in the subjects of law and/or economics. Furthermore, at least one ordinary 
member of the “board” and at least one substitute member must be appointed from 
amongst those enrolled with the Register of the Auditors (kept by the Ministry of 
Justice) which is exclusively accessible only to those endowed with a high level of 
skill in accountancy, illustrated by the taking (and passing) of an accountancy 
exam. 
95 It is worth noting that, for private limited-liability companies, the appointment of statutory audi-
tors is left to the discretion of the bylaws. However, the appointment is mandatory “if the capital is not 
below the minimum provided with respect to limited by share companies” (art. 2477, CC). Incidentally, 
the minimum share capital for a limited by share company is Euro 120,000 (art. 2327, CC). V Buono-
core (ed), Manuale di diritto commerciale (6th edn Giappichelli, 2007 Torino) passim; GF Campobasso, 
Manuale di diritto commerciale, cit. at 250, 287. 
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As to the requisite of independence, such a board shall not be subjected to the 
discretion of the company, rather, in accordance with that deﬁned by the legislator at 
Art. 2399, CC.97
6.3. The External Auditor
In Italy, not only is the auditing system overseen by a specific internal board 
charged with the regulatory audit of the company, legislation also demands the 
inclusion of an additional external auditor whose task is exclusively focused on the 
verification of company accounts.98 
More speciﬁcally, Art. 2409-bis, CC, prescribes the following:
“Auditing of the company’s accounts is carried out by auditor or auditing ﬁrm 
enrolled in the special register kept by the Minister of Justice.” 
The register at stake is that in which accountants, having passed a specific techni-
cal exam, are enrolled. 
As to the functional scope outlining the job of said auditor, according to the Italian 
legislation, the speciﬁcs are detailed in Art. 2409-ter, CC, namely: 
“The auditor or the ﬁrm entrusted with auditing:
a)  Veriﬁes, during the ﬁnancial year and at least on a quarterly basis that 
company’s accounts are kept properly and the transactions are properly re-
ported in the accounting records;
b)  Veriﬁes that the accounts, and the consolidated accounts when drawn up, 
correspond to the results of the accounting records and veriﬁcations carried 
out and that they comply with the relevant law provisions;
c)  Issues an opinion on the accounts and the consolidated accounts, if drawn 
97 More speciﬁcally such a provision states the following:
“The following may not be elected to the ofﬁce of statutory auditor and, if effected, shall forfeit 
their ofﬁce:
a)  Those who are in the conditions provided by article 2382; 
b)  The spouse, the relatives by blood or marriage up to the forth degree of the directors of the 
company, the directors, the spouse, the relatives by blood or marriage up to the forth degree 
of the directors of the company’s subsidiaries, of its parent companies and of companies 
under common control;
c)  Those who are connected with the company or its subsidiaries or its parent companies or 
companies under common control with the company by an employment relationship or an on-
going remunerated relationship of services or works, or by other relationships of economic 
nature which prejudice their independence”
98 In this respect, for a more in-depth analysis, let me refer to my work – P. de Gioia-Carabellese, 
‘Commentary to Artt. 2409-bis, 2409-ter, 2409-quater of the Italian Civil Code’ in G Schiano di Pepe 
& G Fauceglia (eds), Manuale delle Società per Azioni (UTET, Torino 2007) at 929, 970, as well as 
to V Vitalone, ‘Commentary to Art. 2409-sexies of the Italian Civil Code’ in G Schiano di Pepe, cit. 
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up, with a speciﬁc report.” 
Quite interestingly, the two “protagonists” – that is to say, the internal and external 
auditors – traditionally coexist within those Italian companies limited by shares, 
each one assuming control over independent, albeit sometimes overlapping, duties 
(as previously mentioned); however, in specific limited cases,99 the external auditor 
will not be required at all, as in certain circumstances the board of statutory audi-
tors will extend its capacity to include the auditing of accounts, notwithstanding its 
obligations in the field of the regulatory audit.100
7. Italian System of Audit as to Listed Companies and Companies “Resorting 
   to Capital Market”
In addition to the general rules regulating the activities of non-listed companies, 
the Italian legislation also governs over the auditing of listed companies. In this 
case, the relevant source of law is not the CC, but rather a specific piece of legis-
lation aimed at exclusively overseeing this typology of company.101
To elaborate, the distinction between a “regulatory audit” and an accounting one 
is relatively more accentuated in the listed company than in non-listed companies; in 
fact, the legislator clearly requires the two categories of audit to be bestowed respec-
tively on two separate bodies, namely the board of statutory auditors for the regulatory 
audit and an external auditing ﬁrm for the audit of the accounts.
A thorough analysis of the listed companies’ audit in the Italian legislative scenario 
is outwith the parameters of this work.102 However, it will sufﬁce to acknowledge that 
the duties, by which an auditing ﬁrm is bound, as to the performance of the auditing 
of listed company accounts, is neatly summarised under Art. 155 of the CFA: more 
speciﬁcally:
“Auditing ﬁrms entered in the special register referred to in Article 161103 shall 
verify: 
99 Art. 2409-bis(3). It is fundamentally the case of companies “which do not resort to capital mar-
kets and are not required to draw up consolidated accounts”.
100 Also according to Art. 2409-bis(3), “[i]n such case the board of statutory auditors shall consist 
of auditors entered in the register kept at the Ministry of Justice.”
101 The Legislative Decree no. 58 of 14th February 1998 and following amendments. (so called 
Consolidated Finance Act, henceforth also the CFA).
102 However also in this case, more ample analysis is available in P de Gioia-Carabellese, loc. ult. cit.   
103 Art. 161 prescribes that Consob (the Italian supervisory authority on the ﬁnancial markets) “shall 
keep a special register of auditing ﬁrms authorized to perform the activities referred to in Articles 155 
and 158”. The same authority (see para 2 of the same article) “shall enter auditing ﬁrms in the special 
register after verifying that they satisfy the requirements referred to in Article 6(1) of Legislative Decree 
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a) During the ﬁnancial year, that companies’ accounts are kept properly and 
their transactions reported correctly in the accounting records; 
b) That companies’ annual accounts and consolidated accounts correspond to 
the results of the accounting records and tests performed and that they comply 
with the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions.” 
Paragraph 2 of the same continues to stipulate that:
“Auditing ﬁrms may obtain documents and information serving to carry out the 
audit from the company’s directors and may carry out examinations, inspections 
and controls; they shall inform Consob and the board of auditors without delay 
of any facts deemed to be censurable.” 
Finally, the third para specifies that: 
“Auditing ﬁrms shall record information on their activity in a special book kept 
at the registered ofﬁce of the companies that engaged them, according to the 
criteria and procedures laid down by Consob in a regulation. The third para of 
Article 2421 of the Civil Code shall apply.”104
For sake of the integrity of this analysis, it is worth mentioning that, in the same 
Italian system, companies resorting to capital market forces (albeit not listed)105 
shall comply with a rigorous system of audit more akin to that relating to listed 
companies, than to non-listed ones. In other words, the auditing shall be performed 
by an auditing firm enrolled with the register of auditors, which, for this specific 
purpose, shall observe the discipline of auditing set forth for companies whose 
shares are listed on regulated markets.  
 
104 As to the speciﬁc technicalities of these tasks, it is worth mentioning the following articles of 
the CFA: 156 (Auditors report), 157 (Effects of audit opinions on the accounts), 158 (Proposals for 
increases in capital, mergers, spin-offs and the distribution of interim dividends), 159 (Conferment and 
revocation of the engagement), 160 (Incompatibility). Extensive comments relating to Art. 155, CFA, 
are encompassed by the analysis in P Balzarini, ‘Commentary to Art. 155’ in P Marchetti & LA Bianchi 
(eds), La Disciplina delle Società Quotate, Vol. II (Giuffrè, Milano 1999) at 1799, 1819.
105 The deﬁnition of the category is rather subtle: however, in this respect sect. 2325-bis, CC, comes 
to a help by stating that:
“Companies whose shares are listed on regulated markets or distributed among the public to a 
relevant extent are deemed companies resorting to capital markets.”
Among Italian scholars, see ex plurimis, F Di Sabato, Diritto delle Società (2nd edn Giuffrè, Milano 
2005) at 188,189.  NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 783
8. Summary of the Italian System of Corporate Management and Audit
To summarise then, the impact of the Italian corporate legislation, as regards non-
listed companies:
a.  The category of the non-executive director is quite extraneous to the Italian 
corporate governance, particularly in the way the same – without accounting for 
the tautologies and contradictions emphasised supra106 – is traditionally moulded 
by British literature; indeed, the two distinct categories of delegated and non-
delegated directors are acknowledged under Italian statute, but crucially, in this 
case, speciﬁc duties and liabilities are clearly deﬁned;
b.  Such legislation deﬁnes a separate body overseeing the audit of a public limited 
company (i.e. a company limited by shares) as well as of a private limited com-
pany, albeit in the latter case allowing for exceptions;
c.  This body, due to its peculiar composition (incorporating exclusively qualiﬁed 
professionals),107 is potentially in a position to effectively discharge a full range 
of auditing duties, ﬁrstly pertaining to the running of the company from an 
organisational perspective, but also in terms of its accountancy; in this respect, 
the mandatory presence in each board of statutory auditors of qualiﬁed accoun-
tants more than sufﬁces for such a purpose.
d.  The presence of a separate body overseeing the audit of the company in its full-
ness (i.e. that concerning not only the management but also the accounts), is 
conducive to speciﬁc liabilities which the auditors may incur and thereupon owe 
to, vis-à-vis (i) the company,108 (ii) the shareholders, albeit indirectly on behalf 
of the company through a derivative suit,109 (iii) the company creditors and, last 
but not least, (iv) the shareholders (directly rather than through a derivative suit) 
or third parties.110 In this respect, Art. 2407, CC, sets forth the principle accord-
ing to which:
“Statutory auditors shall fulﬁl their duties with the professional capability and 
care required by the nature of their ofﬁce; they shall be liable for the truthful-
106 See particularly Part 6 supra.
107 As already mentioned supra in Part 6, particularly 6.3.
108 Art. 2392, CC, headed “Liability of company”.
According to this provision:
“The directors shall fulﬁll the duties imposed upon them by law and by the by-laws with the 
diligence required by the nature of the ofﬁce and their speciﬁc liabilities. They are jointly and 
severally liable to the company for damages deriving from the observance of such duties, except 
for functions vested in the executive committee or materially vested in one or more directors.”
109 Art. 2393-bis. 
“The company action for liability may be brought also by shareholders representing at least 
one ﬁrth of the company capital or the other fraction of capital – in any case not to exceed one 
third – set forth by the by-laws.”
110 Art. 2395, CC.  However, this action is unanimously considered as an extra-contractual actions, 
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ness of their statements and shall keep facts and documents of which they have 
knowledge because of their ofﬁce conﬁdential”.
Perhaps even more persuasively, the following excerpt assesses the degree 
of their liability, specifically the principle according to which:
“They are jointly and severally liable with the directors for actions or omis-
sions by the latter, where a damage would have not occurred had they super-
vised pursuant to the duties of their ofﬁce.”
The concept at stake epitomised in a nutshell by the Latin maxim culpa in 
vigilando, i.e. the liability arising out of a failure in inspection, rather than 
from a procedural error;
e.  Moreover, the board of statutory auditors existing in Italy functions as an 
important “ﬁlter” between the shareholders and the respective company. In 
this respect, the provision of Art. 2408, CC, allows any shareholder to ﬁle 
a complaint to the board of statutory auditors with regard to facts deemed 
“censurable”. De minimis, the board will be obligated to address such a 
compliant in its annual report to the shareholders’ meeting.111 However, should 
said complaint be lodged by shareholders representing at least one twentieth 
of the company’s share capital (or one ﬁftieth in the case of companies 
resorting to the capital market), para 2 subsequently prescribes that:
“[T]he board of statutory auditors shall investigate on the facts set forth in 
the complaint without delay and submit its ﬁndings and recommendations, if 
any, to the shareholders’ meeting; […]” 
f.  Finally, and referring back to the previous point, any potential argument that 
a separate body in charge of the auditing might, as a consequence of its 
somewhat ‘peripheral’ status, be disarticulated from the very activities it is 
charged with auditing (the resolutions of the board of directors) can easily 
be neutralized by simply reminding oneself of the speciﬁc rules requiring 
the members of the Collegio Sindacale to play an active role in the running 
of the company. Further addressing this aspect, the legislation is adamant in 
stipulating the mandatory presence of the auditors in meetings held by the 
111 Art. 2408(1), CC.  NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 785
board of directors,112 in addition to those prescribing the Collegio Sindacale 
to meet, autonomously, at least every ninety days.113-114
9. Advantages of Certain Aspects of the Italian Corporate Legislation
The analysis conducted in the previous Chapter might help postulate, from a com-
parative law perspective, that in the Italian system the role of the auditors tends 
not to be commingled with that of the directors, regardless of the system of gov-
ernance adopted (therefore also in the one-tier management system). To elaborate, 
the director is, by definition, an “executive”, overseeing the management of the 
company, given the fact that liabilities are extended jointly and severally to all 
members of the board. In addition to not being influenced by the rather nebulous 
figure of the non-executive director, the Italian legislative system, reflecting the 
same authorities, tends to adhere to a concept of regulatory audit, entrusted with a 
specific group of professionals – the board of statutory auditors. This board, with 
its criteria of duties and liabilities (from a quantitative point of view, not dissimilar 
from those of the directors),115 clearly emphasising the duty to supervise, would 
appear to be better equipped to cope with its natural functions; that is to say, a 
regulatory audit of the company, as opposed to an accounting one, conferred on an 
external auditing firm. 
10. Possible Improvements of the UK Corporate Legislation
In dissecting two contrasting jurisdictions, it is invariably problematic, not to say 
pretentious, to propose any transnational adaptation of a legal concept, particularly 
112 In this respect, Art. 2405(1) and (2), CC, prescribes that:
“The statutory auditors shall attend the meetings of the board of directors, shareholders’ meet-
ings and executive committee meetings.
Statutory auditors who, without justiﬁed reason, fail to attend shareholders’ meetings or two 
consecutive meetings of the board of directors or of the executive committee during a ﬁnancial 
year forfeit their ofﬁce.”
113 Art. 2404(1), prescribing that:
“The board of statutory auditors shall meet at least every ninety days. The meeting may also 
take place by means of telecommunication, if the by-laws so permit and indicate the relevant 
procedure.” 
114 The same Art. 2402, CC, at the following para 2, providing that:
“A statutory auditor who, without justiﬁed reason, fails to attend two board meetings during a 
ﬁnancial year, forfeits his ofﬁce.”
115 Judicially, this view is constantly endorsed by the Supreme Court (ex multis, Cassazione, n. 2624 
of 2000) as well as by the lower Italian courts (e.g. Milano Tribunal, 17/01/2007 in (2007) Il Merito 
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so when taking into account the plausible “rejection” to which any implantation of 
an organ into a different “organism” may conceivably give rise.116 
That said, a certain degree of criticism must be expressed with regard to the cur-
rent legal scenario in UK corporate governance. 
Firstly, the rules enshrined in the CA 2006 (governing over the audit) are beset by 
a rather laconic air, particularly if attention is paid to the dearth, within British cor-
porate legislation, of any form of regulatory audit – a staple ingredient of other juris-
dictions. 
Of no less importance, particularly in listed companies, the non-executive directors 
currently reside on the margin of the corporate governance, with their role, functions 
and liabilities legislatively unidentiﬁed and ontologically unsubstantiated. 
Thirdly, the same soft legislation, with its plethora of reports (and, in certain cases, 
inconsistent provisions) – reports that, like clockwork, diachronically follow the 
“bloody” and ﬁnancially excruciating aftermath of a ﬁnancial crises – perennially 
prove to be inefﬁcacious in providing the investor with any adequate legal protection, 
which is, incidentally, the primary purpose of corporate governance.117 
Ideally, (i) a company, particularly if a public one, might require the presence of 
a separate body formed on a mandatory basis (and at the behest of a legislative frame-
work rather than communicated through “codes” devoid of any binding capacity), 
given the fact that a “contradictor” of the board of directors may create a rather more 
reﬂective environment for the decisional process. (ii) In addition to this, such a 
“board”,118 as a body in charge of speciﬁc functions, could be better equipped to dis-
charge such duties, given its practical latitude to focus on speciﬁc, determined func-
tions, in contrast to the incumbent “independent directors” who are hampered by an 
ambiguous sense of mission. (iii) Finally, and beyond the topic of the audit, it is 
undeniable that the corporate governance debate in the UK can no longer refrain from 
adopting convincing Draconian measures towards the category of the non-executive 
directors – a case strengthened further in light of the principles enshrined in the CA 
2006.  
Notwithstanding any requisite caution, it is possible to declare that the example of 
the Italian system of corporate governance, currently arranging for a mandatory 
supervisory body for both public and private companies,119 might be a feasible com-
parator. 
116 It is well known the reluctance towards this form of approach. Ex plurimis, P Legrand, ‘Euro-
pean Legal Systems are not Converging’ (2006) 45 International Comparative Law Quarterly 52, 81; 
Id., ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) The Modern Law Review 44, 63.  
117 Eloquently, according to R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes, A Shleifer & R Vishny, ‘Investor Pro-
tection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) Journal of Financial Economics 58, “Corporate governance 
is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against 
expropriation by the insiders”.  
118 More realistically, such a Board could result in being the same “Committee” that, in the Italian 
legislation, is currently prescribed on mandatory basis in case of one-tier system of corporate gover-
nance. 
119 However, so long as they satisfy a minimum requisite of capital.  NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 787
From a legal perspective, the presence of a body of mandatory auditors overseeing 
the managerial-legal audit and positioned at the pinnacle of the corporate organisa-
tion, parallel to (but not commingled with) the directors, does not appear detrimental 
to the expedition of decision-making within the entity concerned. It is furthermore a 
moot point to remember that said auditors would not have a power of “veto”, nor 
would “their say” be a requisite condition upon which any resolution of the board of 
directors relies on for validity. Such a role,120 fulﬁlled within each company by pro-
fessionals of qualifying competence, could provide signiﬁcant protection not only for 
the minority shareholders, but also for the consumer121 and the taxpayer.122 
As to the methodology whereby the set-up of these prospective new rules should 
occur, the best criterion would appear to be that based on the legislative rules (in this 
respect, the “slogan” should ideally be “laconic provisions of law and clear respon-
sibilities”), rather than the soft-legislation.123 On the other hand, such a solution (pri-
mary legislation rather than mere framework of semi-legislative rank) should not be 
perceived to be an anti-liberal approach, as, in reality, it goes markedly beyond the 
well trodden debate, dear to economists, between minority protection124 and “contrac-
tarianism”. 125-126
120 In this respect, the metaphor utilized by R Smerdon, (Id. A Practical Guide to Corporate Gover-
nance (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) at 126) to deﬁne the proper role of the non-executive 
directors, namely the “terrier”, rather than “watchdog”, is not inappropriate.
121 An example may help. In the current scenario, if a non-listed company decided to market defec-
tive products – not meeting criteria of safety, therefore with a potential damage for the health of several 
consumers in the UK – through a “dodgy” agreement with a contractor outside EU, as long as consumers 
are not actually damaged and denounce the facts, the “con” will probably remain undetected at corporate 
level (needless to say, it is assumed in this simulation that all the directors are complicit in the crime). In 
fact, the auditors (accountants, by deﬁnition) are merely requested to verify the accounts of the company 
but not also the merit, including the legality, of the activities of a company. And in this case, because 
the deal at stake is certainly lucrative, seemingly no objection would be raised in terms of accounts. By 
contrast, in a scenario where professionals, who are members of a separate corporate body (the board 
of the statutory auditors) and take part in the meeting of the board of directors, they would be required 
to immediately challenge the deal, because such auditors would be not simply in charge to check the 
ﬁnancial statements of the company but also to make sure that laws and regulations are observed. See 
P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-executive e Auditors sull’Asse 
Roma-Londra’ cit. at 1573, particularly footnote 127.
122 Stability of the business and its progressive growth may mean creation of jobs. Fast and wild 
growth, with no respect of the rules, in a context of a risky behaviour, may mean in the long run fore-
closure of the same entrepreneurial activity and redundancies, with consequent costs of relocation and 
requaliﬁcation.  
123 In such a provocative way, P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-
executive e Auditors sull’Asse Roma-Londra’ cit. at 1573. 
124 R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes, A Shleifer & R Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance’ cit. 3,4.
125 See in this respect the view of F Easterbrook & DR Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corpo-
rate Law (Harvard University Press, Harvard 1996) passim, particularly at 101. 
126 For more recent descriptions as regard the “ancient” debate, see L E Talbot, Critical Company 
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In fact, in a fast-growing environment of white-collar criminals “sprouting” at an 
exponential rate, a legislative framework, endowed with its “armoury” of persuasive 
sanctions, appears to be a feasible system which could allow for the implementation 
of a substratum of corporate democracy; by contrast, the current “ambience”, where 
so many (often contradictory) rules127 are furnished with mere moral suasion and do 
not originate from legitimate constitutional bodies, probably reﬂects either a past era 
or a perennial utopia.
In practice, the ﬁnancial scandals that, over the last two years, have battered the 
“shores” of the UK ﬁnancial institutions give credence to the argument that the trust 
may be inadequate in the ﬁght to preserve the market and maintain self-regulation – 
an arena where rules tend to be devoid of sanctions in cases of wrongdoing does not 
adequately dissuade the impostors.128  
Taken from a different meta-legal angle of observation, the proposed intervention 
within British legislation, aimed at closing the current loophole in this speciﬁc matter, 
would ﬁnd support in the form of investors’ conﬁdence. On the other hand, any scep-
ticism which would not hesitate to arise, as to an alleged over-invasive presence of 
the mandatory supervisory board, with the potential harm it could impart on small 
businesses, must be roundly dismissed. In this respect, it will sufﬁce to consider the 
enormous stimulus which the business would undeniably reap in the long run as a 
result of prospective greater stability; secondly, and more empirically, the same costs 
entailed in the presence of mandatory auditors in each company cannot be exagger-
ated – a rudimentary glance over the same ﬁgures extracted from jurisdictions where 
the system has been in place for a long time bears testament to this.129
In conclusion, is everything to be “binned” in terms of the UK corporate govern-
ance? The answer is an unequivocal no. From a practical perspective, the continental 
hyper-protective legislative frameworks (particularly, as analysed in this article, the 
Italian one), with its multifarious safeguards (and therefore, with an accompanying 
potential array of controversies), may provide an interesting model in British quoted 
companies, by deﬁnition of big dimensions. In other words, in such companies the 
emphasis typically placed by the Italian legislation upon both the contrasting bodies 
in charge of the audit of the company and on the dual typology of audit (both account-
ing and regulatory) might favourably impact on the degree of investor conﬁdence. 
By contrast, in a “chiastic logic”, as to non-quoted listed companies, the current Brit-
127 In an even more mischievous way, the documents and/or frameworks at stake are offered to the 
“masses” of the investors as ostensive, albeit non-seeming, “Codes.”
128 The Italian system, albeit far from being immune from ﬁnancial scandals, at least may boast 
symbolic achievements in term of sanctions against directors and auditors for maladministration. In the 
notorious “Parmalat scandal”, the maladministration of the directors, with the complicity of both audi-
tors – regulatory and ﬁnancial – and banks, has recently seen a court (Milan Tribunal, 18th December 
2008) issue a ruling stating the liability of all the parties concerned.  See for ﬁrst comments:
http://www.adusbef.lombardia.it/Investimenti/PARMALAT/parmalat-la-sentenza-di-milano-
aggiotaggio.html; http://www.asca.it/news-PARMALAT__SENTENZA_DI_1*_GRADO_A_5_ANNI_
DAL_CRAC_CHE_HA_BRUCIATO_11_MLD-798162-ORA-.html.
129 In an Italian non-listed company with returns amounting to Euro 50,000,000.00, the overall 
annual emoluments for the entire board of statutory directors do not usually exceed Euro 50,000.00.   NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS [2011] EBLR 789
ish corporate legislation in the matter of both governance and supervision (where the 
need for the certainty of law takes precedence over the exaggerated search for the 
ideal of justice) might provide an interesting insight for the “Roman legislator”130 in 
an attempt to deﬁne a more ﬂexible corporate model, where the decision process is 
not “suffocated” by unnecessary safeguards and therefore the neutralization of any 
shape of excessive litigation might improve the difﬁcult conditions of doing business 
in Italy.131 
130 Seemingly, this would end up being a precious “tip” not simply for the Italian legislator, but also 
for the continental one, broadly considered. 
131 P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance, Amministratori Non-executive e Auditors 
sull’Asse Roma-Londra’ cit. at 1573, 1574. 